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Abstract 
Geographically targeted crime control is a controversial attempt to alleviate crime, 
which risks the displacement of crime into neighbouring areas. The 2014 Sydney 
lockout laws have decreased the nightlife economy and violence in the entertainment 
districts having displaced them into neighbouring areas. We investigate the effect of the 
Sydney lockout laws on rental prices in the displacement areas, and find a relatively 
weak and short-lived negative effect on small dwellings and a persistent positive effect 
on large dwellings. Our results indicate the long-term positive effect of the lockout laws 
on the land value of surrounding areas despite reported crime displacement. 
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Geographically targeted crime control, which targets “hot spots” rather than the root 
cause of the crime phenomenon, is a controversial attempt to alleviate the incidence of 
criminal behaviour. Controversy exists over the concern that targeting the location of 
offences may lead to the displacement of crime into areas that are exempt from 
regulations, creating socio-spatial ghettos in bordering areas (Fischer et al., 2004; 
Bowers et al., 2011; Telep et al., 2014). The Sydney lockout laws, which were 
implemented in 2014 as part of the New South Wales Government’s crackdown on drug 
and alcohol-fuelled violence, have restricted popular and iconic establishments in the 
once bustling Sydney Entertainment District (SED) (Spicer, 2015), and have diverted 
late night partygoers to alternative destinations that have bars, clubs, and other licensed 
venues (Ralston, 2015). There have been reports of increased violence and feelings of 
unsafety, including the death of a man in Waterloo as the result of a coward punch 
(Levy, 2015). A recent article by Donnelly et al. (2016) reports an increase in assaults at 
The Star casino, which is outside the SED, since the introduction of the lockout laws. 
Evidence tends to show that the decrease in crime in targeted areas is much 
larger than the increase in crime in flock areas, implying the overall positive effect of 
geographically targeted policies (Guerette and Bowers, 2009; Bowers et al., 2011; 
Johnson et al., 2012; Telep et al., 2014). Donnelly et al. (2016) conclude that the 
increase in assaults at The Star Casino they find is much smaller than the decreases in 
assault in the SED areas after the lockout laws. Yet, the potentially negative impact on 
flock area communities inevitably leads to intense public debate. At the same time, the 
Sydney lockout laws have led to the displacement of nightlife entertainment as well 
(Spicer, 2015). The new function of flock areas as “trendy” entertainment hubs may be 
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an attractive feature for certain individuals and may have contributed to local housing 
demand as a result of the proximity to nightlife or increased job opportunities. Because 
of these opposing effects of the laws on surrounding areas, the direction of the overall 
effect on the flock areas is theoretically indeterminate. The hasty passing of the lockout 
laws did not consider the possible unintended effect on surrounding areas, and despite a 
flood of media articles and concerns expressed by residents, there is little empirical 
evidence for the effect of the lockout laws on the displacement areas. Such evidence is 
critical in the cost-benefit consideration of geographically targeted crime control 
policies. 
In this paper, we study the causal effect of the “flock” phenomenon of the 
Sydney lockout laws on rental prices in the local housing market. To separate the causal 
effect of the lockout laws from secular housing market trends, we rely on a quasi-
experimental research design in which we apply a difference-in-difference (DID) 
approach to the postcode-level weekly rent data. Given our concern about potential 
heterogeneity in the causal effect, we also conduct sub-sample analysis to separately 
evaluate the causal effect by dwelling size. 
A variety of methods are used in the literature to quantify the indirect and 
intangible cost of crime, such as hedonic regression (e.g. Tita, Petras, and Greenbaum, 
2006) and the life satisfaction approach (e.g. Manning, Fleming, and Ambrey, 2015). In 
this paper, we follow the spirit of hedonic regression and assume that housing market 
prices provide sufficient statistics to measure the value of a local neighbourhood, 
because housing prices are determined by a market mechanism that reflects various 
short-term and long-term factors of the neighbourhood that buyers and sellers take into 
consideration. There are myriad studies on the negative effect of crime on local housing 
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demand (Rizzo, 1979; Dubin and Goodman, 1982; Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Tita, Petras, 
and Greenbaum, 2006; Linden and Rockoff, 2008; Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2010; 
Klimova and Lee, 2014). Conversely, the Allen Consulting Group (2012) reports a 
positive relationship between the density of licensed premises and housing rental prices 
in New South Wales, which suggests that renters are attracted to areas with a high 
density of licensed premises. Bianchi (2015) also suggests that the culture of late-night 
drinking in entertainment venues may be a drawcard for young renters at the same time 
as causing increased security concerns for families. The standard hedonic approach may 
yield misleading estimates as a result of various confounding factors, but we employ a 
rigorous causal framework in a similar manner to other recent studies (Linden and 
Rockoff, 2008; Klimova and Lee, 2014). We study rental prices rather than housing 
prices, which is motivated by the following two facts: rental price data offer a 
substantially larger number of observations than housing price data, and rental prices 
react more quickly to exogenous changes than housing prices. The use of rental prices is 
therefore suitable for evaluating not only the long-term effect of the lockout laws but 
also the short-term effect. 
Our results are summarised as follows. The overall-effect models show that the 
introduction of the lockout laws has had no statistically significant causal effect on 
median rental prices in displacement areas. However, sub-sample analysis reveals 
differential causal effects: a negative effect on one-bedroom dwellings and a positive 
effect on 3+ bedroom dwellings. The former effect is relatively weak and short-lived, 
while the latter is persistent, indicating that the positive effect dominates in the long run. 
These opposite effects offset each other and consequently result in the insignificant 
estimate in the overall-effect models. We speculate that the differential effect arises 
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because of spatial heterogeneity: smaller dwellings tend to be located closer to main 
bars and entertainment strips whereas larger dwellings tend to be in a quieter 
neighbourhood of the postcode. The dual effect of the lockout laws suggests that well-
designed geographically targeted alcohol control can be a cost-effective approach even 
when its effect on the displacement areas is taken into consideration. 
 
2. The Sydney Lockout Laws 
On 21 January 2014 the New South Wales State Government announced new 
restrictions on licensed premises to reduce alcohol-related violence. The legislation, 
which took effect on 24 February 2014, included a lockout of new patrons to hotels, 
registered clubs, nightclubs, and karaoke bars 1  after 1:30 am in the Sydney 
Entertainment District (SED), which comprises the areas of Sydney Central Business 
District (CBD), Woolloomooloo, Potts Point, Kings Cross, and parts of Darlinghurst, 
including Oxford Street; cessation of alcohol service in these venues at 3:00 am; the 
banning of designated “troublemakers” from entering these venues; and a ban on 
takeaway alcohol sales after 10:00 pm across New South Wales (NSW Government, 
2014; Donnelly et al., 2016). Given the prevalence of late-night drinking and pre-
drinking culture in Australia (Miller et al., 2016), limiting late-night access to licensed 
venues has potential for significantly reducing alcohol-fuelled violence and crime. 
 Studies and reports offer clear evidence that the Sydney lockout laws have 
reduced the amount of alcohol related violence in the SED (Fulde et al., 2015; 
Menéndez et al., 2015; Ralston, 2015; Donnelly et al., 2016). Fulde et al. (2015) report 
a significant reduction in alcohol-related injuries and trauma presentations at a nearby 
                                                 
1 Small bars (maximum 60 people), most restaurants, and tourism accommodation establishments are 




hospital. Menéndez et al. (2015) also find that the Sydney lockout laws have reduced 
the incidence of assault in the Kings Cross and CBD entertainment precincts.  
 
3. Past Studies on the Effect of Nightlife Restriction Laws 
Violence in entertainment districts is a major problem across urban landscapes around 
the world, and geographically targeted crime control has been widely used (Braga et al., 
2014). There is resounding evidence in both Australia and the world that government 
enforced restrictions on alcohol access reduce crime and violence. In Australia, lockout 
laws were implemented in the Newcastle CBD in March 2008, and Kypri et al. (2011) 
report a 37% decrease in assaults in the restricted area. Douglas (1998) studies the 
restriction of access to alcohol in the community of Halls Creek in Western Australia, 
and finds that a reduction in the trading hours of licenced premises is associated with a 
reduction in the consumption of alcohol, the incidence of crime, alcohol-related 
presentations at hospital, and the incidence of domestic violence. A significant 
reduction in the number of violent incidents due to lockout legislation is also reported 
for Queensland (Mazerolle et al., 2012). Internationally, Voas et al. (2002) report 
reduction in cross-border drinking as the result of the early closure of bars around the 
US-Mexico border. Mandatory early closure of bars and restaurants also reduced 
homicides, violence, and deaths by car accidents in the São Paolo Metropolitan Areas 
(Biderman et al., 2010). In Amsterdam, the reverse was shown to occur when extended 
opening hours correlated with a significant increase in alcohol-related injuries and 
violence (De Goeij et al., 2015). Permitting weekend alcohol sales also resulted in 
increase in crime in the US (Heaton, 2012) and Sweden (Grönqvist and Niknami, 2014).  
Most of the above studies employ a rigorous causal evaluation framework, and the 
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literature has by now accumulated plenty of evidence for the general effectiveness of 
restrictions on alcohol access on crime prevention. 
 The evidence for the effect of lockout laws on displacement areas is mixed and 
relatively scarce. Although most studies are observational rather than based on a 
rigorous quasi-experimental design, a series of reviews have found that the 
displacement of crime, if any, is uncommon and small (Guerette and Bowers, 2009; 
Bowers et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2012; Telep et al., 2014). In Australia, Kypri et al. 
(2011) report that there has been no overall geographic displacement of assault from the 
Newcastle CBD to a nearby area with a similar night-time economy. Mazerolle et al. 
(2011) also find no displacement of violence to surrounding areas following lockout 
legislation in Queensland. In the case of the Sydney lockout laws, however, the 
geographical displacement of violence and crime has been reported as discussed above 
(Levy, 2015; Donnelly et al. 2016), whereas Menéndez et al. (2015) do not find 
statistically significant changes in displacement areas.  
 
4. Data 
4.1.  Data Sources and Sample Selection 
The main dataset is drawn from the Rent and Sales Reports, a quarterly report of weekly 
rents in the greater metropolitan region of Sydney published by the NSW Government’s 
Housing department. 2  Using the supplementary table ‘A1: Median Weekly Rents - 
Greater Metropolitan Region by Postcodes - All Dwellings’ (NSW Government: Family 
& Community Services, 2015), we compile quarterly postcode-level panel data that 
provide the median weekly rental price by number of bedrooms – 1, 2, 3, and 4+ 
                                                 
2 The data are publicly accessible from the ‘Reports, Plans & Paper’ section at the website of Housing 
NSW, the NSW Government’s housing department, www.housing.nsw.gov.au. 
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bedrooms. In the report, the median rental price is left blank if less than ten active bonds 
are registered in the postcode, but missing values are rare due to our focus on inner-city 
areas, where a large number of rental properties are always on the market. 
The main analysis relies on data from the June 2013, September 2013, 
December 2013, June 2014, September 2014, December 2014, March 2015, June 2015, 
September 2015, and December 2015  tables (NSW Government: Family & Community 
Services, 2015, Issues 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, and 114, 
respectively). The March 2014 dataset is excluded from the analysis because it relates to 
the period between 1st January 2014 and 31st March 2014, in which the announcement 
and subsequent implementation of the lockout laws took place. The time frame of our 
analysis therefore utilises three quarterly periods before the announcement of the 
lockout laws (June 2013 – December 2013) and seven quarterly periods after the 
implementation of the laws (June 2014 – December 2015). Although data before June 
2013 is available, we choose the 2013 June quarter as the starting point of our analysis 
because the data from March reports tend to be noisy due to a downturn in the Sydney 
real estate market during the Christmas and New Year period, which is followed by a 
revival in February (NSW Government: Fair Trading 2014). Utilising the data of seven 
periods after the implementation of the lockout laws benefits our statistical inference by 
providing a larger number of observations; however, including such a long period might 
attenuate the causal effect we hope to estimate, especially if the effect of the lockout 
laws exists only for a short term. To address this concern, we also conduct a robustness 





4.2. Flock and Control Groups 
Table 1 lists the postcode areas used in our analysis as the displacement or “flock” areas. 
Because there is no unique, objective way to classify areas into the flock and control 
areas, we used a mixture of data from a widely known early study of the lockout laws 
by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research – the BOCSAR report (Menéndez 
et al., 2015) as well as anecdotal evidence from the national and local media. The areas 
identified in the media articles are largely consistent with the data from the BOCSAR 
report. The BOCSAR report includes Bondi and Coogee as displacement areas, but we 
exclude these two suburbs because their beachside demographics are substantially 
different from the inner-city suburbs in the “flock” group. Bondi and Coogee are 
excluded also because our analysis is based on the postcode level data, and the 
postcodes for Bondi and Coogee include rather large suburban areas of North Bondi and 
South Coogee. The addition of Erskineville is motivated by the relocation of a popular 
entertainment venue, The Spice Cellar, from Martin Place to Erskineville (Milton, 
2015). Similarly, Waterloo is added because of the recent death of a man as a result of a 
coward punch (Levy, 2015). 
[ Insert Table 1 Here – The Flock Areas ] 
To evaluate the causal effect of the lockout laws, we compare the median 
weekly rent in the flock areas with that of the control areas, which have no major 
nightlife economy but are otherwise similar to the flock areas. The control group 
consists of postcode areas within eight kilometres of the CBD. We use this radius 
criterion because postcode areas outside the 8km radius are likely to have substantially 
different demographics to the flock group. Although the 8km radius is an arbitrary 
decision, we argue that it gives a control group of inner-city and surrounding suburbs 
11 
 
that have a time trend similar to the flock group. For example, the 8km criterion 
excludes suburbs in the Northern Beaches, which have beachside demographics, and 
Chatswood, which can be regarded as having its own business district. Postcodes within 
a certain radius are found using FreeMapTools,3 and verified manually by Google Maps 
to ensure that the average distance from the CBD to suburbs within a specific postcode 
area is calculated accurately. We apply the same procedure to adjacent postcodes to 
ensure that no postcode is wrongfully omitted or included. The mean of the distance of 
the suburbs within a postcode from the CBD is also added to the dataset as a control 
variable.  
The postcodes of the lockout and other CBD areas (the SED areas) are excluded 
for the purpose of focusing the analysis on our main interest – the effect of the flock 
phenomenon, rather than the direct impact of the lockout itself on the regulated areas. 
Furthermore, those lockout areas have substantially higher rental prices than the areas in 
our treatment and control groups. Postcode 2026, which denotes Bondi, is also excluded 
from the control group, as noted above, due to its unique beachside characteristics. 
Figure 1 shows a map of the flock, lockout, and control areas. For the complete 
postcode list, see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
An ideal, more subjective approach to designing treatment and control groups 
would be to classify them based on distance between each rental property and its nearest 
nightlife venue. We do not take this approach because the exact location and rental price 
of each property and the comprehensive list of nightlife venues and their locations are 
not readily available. We thus use a mixture of data from early studies and anecdotal 
evidence from the media, but the subjective nature of this approach leads to a concern 




about potential estimation bias due to misclassification. To address this concern, we 
conduct a series of robustness tests and confirm the robustness of the main results. 
[ Insert Figure 1 Here – Flock, Control, and Lockout Postcodes ] 
In our analysis, a postcode area in a given quarter comprises the unit of 
observation. Table 2 reports the summary statistics of median weekly rent by bedroom 
type and treatment status. The mean of median weekly rents is calculated across 
postcode areas in the period from June 2013 to December 2015. The first column 
confirms that the weekly rent increases with the number of bedrooms. The last category 
– 4+ bedroom dwellings – has considerably less observations than dwellings with fewer 
bedrooms because of the small number of bond lodgements for larger inner-city rental 
dwellings. The next two columns show that approximately 16% of our observations are 
from the flock (treatment) group. There is no significant difference in the average rent 
between the flock and control groups. The average rent of the 4+ bedroom type in the 
flock group is considerably lower than that of the control group, but the number of 
observations in the 4+ bedroom type is small and the standard deviations are large. This 
difference is smaller when median is used instead of mean across postcode-periods. 
[ Insert Table 2 Here – Summary Statistics of Median Weekly Rent ] 
The three panels in Figure 2 illustrate time trends in weekly rent by bedroom 
type. Each panel shows the time trends of the flock and control areas. The time trend of 
the lockout group is also shown for comparison. The three time series data in each panel 
show reasonably similar fluctuations before the implementation of the lockout laws in 
the March 2014 quarter. After the implementation of the laws, there is a noticeable 
plummet in the rent for one-bedroom dwellings in the treatment group for the 
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September 2014 quarter, which appears to be a short-run effect of the lockout laws. This 
drop in one-bedroom rent around the September 2014 quarter is the only easily 
noticeable trend diversion following the implementation of the lockout laws, whereas 
no such effect is observed in larger dwellings, and the effect on one-bedroom dwellings 
appears to be short-lived, since it shows recovery shortly afterwards. Our extensive 
search identifies no other explanation for the rent plummet. In fact, the timing of the 
rent plummet coincides with rising rental rates and substantially low vacancy rates in 
the Sydney market (Wilson, 2014). 
[ Insert Figure 2 Here – Trends in Weekly Rent ] 
 
4.3. Area Characteristics 
In the regression analysis, we use area characteristics to control for factors specific to 
each postcode area. Table 3 lists the area variables with their definitions as well as 
summary statistics for the treatment and control groups. The distance from the CBD is 
obtained as explained in the previous subsection. The percentage of renters, the 
percentage of single-person households, the average number of children, median age, 
and median weekly household income for each postcode area are collected from the 
2011 Census. The number of schools is cumulatively added for all suburbs contained in 
the postcode based on information collected from the My School website.4 
[ Insert Table 3 Here – Area Characteristics Variables ] 
Table 3 profiles the flock and control groups, as well as the statistical difference 
between the two groups in the last column. The postcode areas in the control group tend 




to be farther from the CBD, have fewer renters and more families than the flock areas. 
There is no statistically significant difference in the other characteristic variables. The 
DID approach allows for systematic difference between the treatment and control 
groups, and we can obtain an unbiased estimate of the causal effect as long as the two 
groups follow the same time trend without the treatment, which is reasonably supported 
by Figure 2. Nevertheless, the common trend assumption is generally more plausible if 
the treatment and control groups are similar, and the fact that our flock and control areas 
show no statistically significant difference in the median age and median income 
supports our econometric setup. We also conduct a number of sensitivity analyses in 
Section 6 to confirm that our results are robust over the selection of the two groups and 
not driven by a peculiar nature of data or a particular time point/postcode. Furthermore, 
our thorough background investigation identifies no major area-specific external shocks 
or policy changes during our sample period that may cause differential trends in weekly 
rents across the areas and thereby bias our DID estimates. 
 
4.4 Difference-In-Difference Approach 
We start our econometric analysis with a simple linear regression model, as a 
benchmark, that compares the flock and control groups after the implementation of the 
lockout laws. In this simple model (ex post OLS), the median weekly rent of postcode 
area i in quarter t, which we denote 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡, is explained by 
(1)               𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + ∑ 𝜏𝑗
𝐷𝑒𝑐15
𝑗=𝑆𝑒𝑝14
𝐼[𝑡 = 𝑗] + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 is an indicator variable for the postcodes in the flock group, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector 
of the other area characteristics variables, 𝐼[𝑡 = 𝑗] is an indicator function for quarter j, 
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(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜏𝑆𝑒𝑝14, … , 𝜏𝐷𝑒𝑐15) is a set of parameters to be estimated, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
Data from June 2014 to December 2015 quarters are used in this regression, with June 
2014 being the reference period. The inclusion of the quarter dummies is important 
because the strong demand for housing since 2012 has led to a steadily increasing trend 
in rental prices Sydney-wide (Wilson, 2014). We have also attempted median rent in the 
log for the dependent variable, but the results are similar, with slightly worse fit than the 
non-log results. 
The parameter of interest in Equation (1) is 𝛼. However, it is unlikely to yield an 
unbiased estimate of the causal effect of the flock phenomenon because the flock areas 
are not identical to the control areas even without the lockout laws, and the estimator is 
thus plagued by a number of confounding factors that cannot be fully captured by the 
limited number of area characteristics variables we have in (1) (e.g., see Breen et al., 
2011, for the potential relationship between alcohol-related crime and community 
characteristics). By the same token, the comparison between the weekly rents in flock 
areas for the periods before and after the lockout laws does not produce a reliable causal 
estimate because it is also biased by confounding time trends in crime (Leung et al., 
2015) and trends in the housing market (Wilson, 2014). To obtain credible estimates, 
we rely on a quasi-experimental research design in which the following DID model is 
applied to the sample that contains both pre- and post-periods (June 2013 to December 
2015 without March 2014): 
(2)           𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝛿𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝜏𝑗
𝐷𝑒𝑐15
𝑗=𝑆𝑒𝑝13
𝐼[𝑡 = 𝑗] + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 , 
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where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is an indicator variable for the quarter periods after the implementation of 
the lockout laws, and 𝛿 is the parameter of interest, which gives us the causal estimate 
of the flock phenomenon. We also estimate two variants of (2): one that includes 𝑋𝑖𝛽, 
and one that includes postcode fixed effects. These two refinements attempt to control 
for the time-invariant characteristics of each area for a potentially better statistical 
inference, although there is a possibility that including additional controls adds 
irrelevant parameters and reduces statistical efficiency. Hence, there is no clear order 
among the three DID specifications, but they all provide unbiased causal estimates of 
the flock phenomenon as long as the common trend assumption is satisfied. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Overall Effect 
We first report the regression results of the pooled dataset, which includes all the 
observations of dwellings with 1, 2, 3, and 4+ bedrooms. Table 4 shows the results of 
the four regression models: [1] ex post OLS, [2] DID with no controls, [3] DID with 
controls, and [4] DID with fixed effects. Model [1] is based on a smaller number of 
observations than the other models because it only uses the time points after the 
implementation of the laws. Because the median rents are likely to be correlated across 
dwelling types and over time, statistical inference in all regressions is based on standard 
errors robust to heteroscedasticity and postcode-level clustering.5 
Overall, the control variables exhibit reasonable coefficient estimates. Weekly rents 
increase with the number of bedrooms, the proximity to the CBD, and the median 
household income in the area. The positive and significant coefficients on the 
                                                 
5 Bertrand et al. (2004) examine the credibility of difference-in-difference estimates and report that the 
clustering approach tends to yield desirable results in broader settings than other methods they test. 
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percentages of renters and singles reflect a relatively large demand for rental properties 
for these demographics. The number of children has a positive and significant 
coefficient, which probably reflects the demand for relatively large dwellings. The 
number of schools per 1,000 population exhibits a negative and significant coefficient, 
probably because schools are more likely to be located in areas with lower land prices. 
The estimated coefficients on the quarter dummies are consistent with the housing 
market boom in Sydney (Wilson, 2014). Adding area characteristics to the regression 
increases R-squared from 0.739 in Model [2] to 0.814 in Model [3]. 
[ Insert Table 4 Here – Effect of Lockout Laws – Overall Effect ] 
While these regression models show satisfying goodness of fit and coefficient 
estimates with statistical significance and expected signs, the impact of the flock 
phenomenon is not evident in all the models. Model [1] indicates that rents in the flock 
areas after the lockout laws are lower by $29.87 than in the control areas, whereas the 
three DID estimates are positive, attributing an increase of $15.73 to $20.53 in weekly 
rents to the causal effect of the flock phenomenon. However, all these estimates lack 
statistical significance. 
 
5.2. Heterogeneity by Bedroom Type 
The results discussed in Subsection 5.1 are derived from data that pool all types of 
dwellings and are appropriate only when similar magnitudes of causal effect for all 
bedroom types are assumed, or when we are only interested in the average causal effect 
over all bedroom types. In reality, renters of small houses and large houses may have 
substantially different preferences, hence the magnitude of the causal effect may differ 
by bedroom type. To address this concern, we conduct a sub-sample analysis in which 
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we repeat the same set of regression models for the sample of different bedroom types. 
Table 5 summarises the results, with four panels dedicated to four bedroom types. We 
do not estimate the model solely for the 4+ bedroom type because the number of 
observations in this category is small, and we instead combine 3 bedroom and 4+ 
bedroom data in Panel (D). The full results are reported in the Appendix. 
[ Insert Table 5 Here – Effect of Lockout Laws – By Bedroom Type ] 
The results in Table 5 reveal a clear contrast across bedroom types. The DID 
estimates for one-bedroom dwellings, which are 10% or nearly 10% significant, indicate 
a small, negative causal effect of the flock phenomenon. No statistically significant 
causal effect is found in the results for 2 bedroom dwellings. In sharp contrast with 
these results, the DID estimates for the 3 bedroom and 3+ bedroom dwellings are 
positive and highly significant. For example, the three DID models in Panel (C) indicate 
that the flock phenomenon has increased the weekly rent of 3 bedroom dwellings by 
approximately twenty dollars. The observed heterogeneous effect explains why no 
significant effect is found in the analysis of the overall sample in Table 4, where the 
negative effect of one-bedroom dwellings and the positive effect of 3+ bedroom 
dwellings counteract each other. 
 
6. Robustness of Results 
To confirm the credibility of the results, we estimate variants of DID regressions as 
robustness tests. Table 6 reports their DID estimates (the estimated coefficients on 
Flock*Post). In the first test conducted, we repeat the same analysis using the period 
from June 2013 to December 2014, instead of June 2013 to December 2015. This is 
motivated by the speculation that there might be a short-run effect and a long-run effect 
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of the lockout laws. The results in Panel (A) of Table 6 show that the negative DID 
estimates for one-bedroom dwellings are larger and more significant than were 
previously obtained and that the positive DID estimates for 3 and 3+ bedroom types are 
smaller and less significant. This finding is consistent with the aforementioned 
observations from Figure 2, indicating that the negative impact of the flock 
phenomenon was only short-run and outweighed by the positive effect for larger houses, 
which remained after the first several quarters. Nevertheless, the contrast between the 
negative effect for the one-bedroom group and the positive effect for the 3+ bedroom 
group is still evident in this short-term analysis.  
[ Insert Table 6 Here – Robustness of DID Regression Results ] 
We then repeat the regression analysis, altering the set of treatment and control 
postcodes. First, we conduct the analysis in which the control group is restricted to 
postcode areas whose centroid is within six kilometres of the CBD, instead of the initial 
eight kilometres. This is motivated by the fact that, as shown in Table 3, the original 
control areas are on average two kilometres farther from the CBD than the flock areas. 
When we impose the 6km restriction, the number of control postcode areas reduces 
from 35 to 17, and the statistical differences in area characteristics between the control 
and treatment areas become less significant. The results shown in Panel (B) of Table 6 
confirm the robustness of our results. The DID estimates exhibit lower statistical 
significance than previously, but this is mainly due to the loss of observations in the 
control group. Nevertheless, the signs of the DID estimates are consistent with the 
results in Table 5 and the magnitudes tend to be even larger. 
Panels (C-1) to (C-6) show the results of robustness tests in which we repeatedly 
move each of the six treatment group postcodes to the control group. We conduct this 
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analysis because the classification of the treatment and control groups is somewhat 
subjective partly based on media coverage and anecdotal evidence, hence 
misclassification is possible. These robustness tests are also useful in checking whether 
our results are driven by one particular postcode. The results of this test further 
highlight the robustness of our main results. Although the magnitudes of the DID 
estimates and their statistical significance vary across the different sets of treatment 
postcodes, all six experiments show a consistent pattern: there is weak evidence for a 
negative effect for one-bedroom dwellings and a positive, statistically significant effect 
for 3 and 3+ bedroom dwellings. 
 
7.  Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we studied the causal effect of the flock phenomenon of the Sydney 
lockout laws on rental prices by applying a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to 
postcode-level weekly rent data. Although the overall effect models find no statistically 
significant causal effect, sub-sample analysis reveals differential causal effects: a 
negative effect on one-bedroom dwellings and a positive effect on 3+ bedroom 
dwellings. The former effect is short-lived, while the latter is persistent, hence the 
positive effect on the flock areas appears to dominate in the long run. These opposite 
effects offset each other and consequently result in the insignificant estimate in the 
overall effect models. This pattern is found to be robust across alternative specifications. 
Why has the flock phenomenon led to differential effects?  We speculate that 
these differential effects have arisen from the geographical heterogeneity of dwellings 
of different sizes. Our analysis is at the postcode level, which is not very finely defined: 
our sample postcodes have a population of 13,300 on average. Consequently, the area 
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inside each postcode may not be geographically homogeneous, hence our conjecture is 
that one-bedroom dwellings (typically units in an apartment building) tend to be close to 
main bars and entertainment strips, whereas dwellings with 3+ bedrooms (typically 
houses) tend to be in a quiet part of the postcode. If that is the case, the increase in 
alcohol-fuelled risk, together with street noise and feelings of unsafety, is more salient 
to renters of one-bedroom dwellings, whereas the benefit of having a bustling 
entertainment strip within walking distance outweighs the disadvantages for renters of 
dwellings with 3+ bedrooms. 
Another possible explanation lies in the dissimilar demographics of different 
size dwellings. In particular, there is a high possibility that dwellings with 3+ bedrooms 
for rent in flock areas are share-houses due to the likely demographic of the occupants 
and the proximity of the dwellings to universities and other types of educational 
institutions. As students generally have low incomes, shared housing (usually a 
dwelling with three or more bedrooms) may be more economical than renting a smaller 
dwelling alone. The increase in nightlife in these flock areas is now an added drawcard 
for students and may have increased the demand for larger dwellings in these areas. 
There may be other explanations. Identifying the true mechanism behind the 
heterogeneous effect is left for future research. 
Our results highlight the importance of potential heterogeneity in the effect of 
geographical alcohol control policies. Our results also highlight heterogeneity in the 
time dimension and show contrasting short-run and long-run effects. 
Our causal estimates may be biased due to the general equilibrium effect, that is, 
the possibility that renters move between the flock areas and the control areas and the 
demand of new renters for housing equilibrates between the flock areas and the control 
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areas. This equilibrium effect affects our estimates not only by changing the rental 
prices in the treatment group but also by changing the rental prices in the control group 
in the opposite direction. Our estimates may therefore overstate the true causal effect; 
however, this general equilibrium effect may be of secondary importance, and it does 
not affect the direction of our causal estimates. 
Some of the displacement areas, such as Newtown and Enmore, are currently 
under consideration for the introduction of self-imposed 3:00 am lockout laws (Koziol, 
2015). The lockout laws have also been considered repeatedly in Melbourne (Yahoo7, 
2016) since the city adopted the laws in 2008 and abandoned the trail three months later 
(Brook, 2016). The state of Queensland has recently announced the lockout laws to be 
implemented from 1 February 2017 (Queensland Government, 2016). While the 
introduction of the lockout laws is likely to improve safety in these areas, its possible 
impact on neighbouring districts requires careful examination. The dual effect of the 
lockout laws we find in this paper suggests that well-designed geographically targeted 
alcohol control can be a cost-effective approach even when crime displacement is taken 
into consideration, because the Sydney lockout laws have resulted in the relocation of 
not only violence and crime but also nightlife entertainment hubs. The negative impact 
is weak and short-lived, whereas the positive effect appears to be relatively large and 
persistent. Our results are consistent with the report by Donnelly et al. (2016) and the 
evidence in the literature (Guerette and Bowers, 2009; Bowers et al., 2011; Johnson et 
al., 2012; Telep et al., 2014), which consistently reveals that the amount of crime 
displaced is far less than the amount of crime prevented in the target areas. Research 
also suggests a possible “diffusion of crime control benefits” to surrounding areas 
(Clarke and Weisburd, 1994; Bowers et al., 2011). At the same time, our finding of the 
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negative flock effect on small dwellings suggests that effective transitional crime 
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Table 1: The Flock Areas 
Postcode Suburb 
2009 Pyrmont and Darling Island 
2016 Redfern 
2017 Waterloo and Zetland 
2037 Glebe, Harold Park and Forest Lodge 






Table 2: Summary Statistics of Median Weekly Rent  
MedianWeeklyRent (AU$) All sample areas Flock areas Control areas 
All types   
    Mean 703.7 702.4 703.9 
    Standard deviation (262.7) (198.3) (273.1) 
    Number of observations 1,223 193 1,030 
(A) 1 bedroom dwellings   
    Mean 469.5 479.7 467.5 
    Standard deviation (57.4) (62.7) (56.2) 
    Number of observations 370 60 310 
(B) 2 bedroom dwellings   
    Mean 629.7 672.5 622.1 
    Standard deviation (75.2) (40.9) (77.4) 
    Number of observations 399 60 339 
(C) 3 bedroom dwellings   
    Mean 890.7 891.2 890.6 
    Standard deviation (142.9) (87.5) (151.4) 
    Number of observations 371 60 311 
(D) 4+ bedroom dwellings   
    Mean 1,267.7 997.5 1,317.9 
    Standard deviation (373.4) (196.9) (377.7) 
    Number of observations 83 13 70 
Note: MedianWeeklyRent is the median weekly rental price of bonds lodged with the Renting and Strata 













KmsCBD The mean distance from the CBD (km) of the 
suburbs within the postcode 
3.75 5.80 -2.04 *** 
%Renters The percentage of renters in the postcode 
population 
58.87 43.53 15.34 *** 
%Singles The percentage of single-person households in the 
postcode population 
77.08 75.71 1.37 
AvgNumChild The average number of children per household in 
the postcode 
1.48 1.65 -0.16 *** 
MedAge The median age of the population of a postcode 34.17 36.23 -2.06 
MedIncome The median weekly household income for the 
postcode 
1,739 1,992 -253 
SchoolsPer1000 The number of schools per 1,000 people in the 
postcode 
0.29 0.48 -0.19 
Note: All variables are defined at the time of the 2011 Census. The numbers are based on 6 flock 
postcode areas and 41 control postcode areas. In the last column, the results of t tests for the statistical 






Table 4: Effect of Lockout Laws – Overall Effect 
Dependent variable: 
       MedianWeeklyRent 








Sample periods used Jun14–Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 
Bedroom type (reference: one-bedroom)    
      2 Bedroom 165.23*** 160.58*** 160.10*** 161.52*** 
 (8.32) (7.41) (8.10) (7.77) 
      3 Bedroom 428.38*** 421.83*** 421.66*** 421.14*** 
 (18.11) (18.46) (17.92) (18.26) 
      4+ Bedroom 819.13*** 796.58*** 800.10*** 812.52*** 
 (91.77) (104.71) (92.35) (91.35) 
Flock -29.87 -16.39 -46.11  
 (29.57) (38.05) (35.01)  
Flock*Post (DID Estimator)  20.53 15.73 16.86 
  (15.45) (15.43) (15.24) 
KmsCBD -18.33**  -17.57*  
 (8.60)  (8.72)  
%Renters 5.03**  4.82**  
 (1.90)  (1.83)  
%Singles 13.70*  13.87**  
 (7.25)  (6.87)  
AvgNumChild 386.50***  362.02***  
 (98.96)  (93.01)  
MedAge 5.24  4.46  
 (4.17)  (3.92)  
MedIncome 0.15***  0.15***  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  
SchoolsPer1000 -42.37***  -45.19***  
 (12.37)  (12.66)  
Sep13  -5.23 -5.37 -3.92 
  (9.33) (9.24) (9.11) 
Dec13  9.15 9.48 12.46 
  (8.48) (7.76) (7.70) 
Jun14  26.37*** 29.46*** 31.06*** 
  (8.98) (8.22) (8.12) 
Sep14 -12.46 12.42* 16.88** 16.78** 
 (8.69) (6.65) (6.51) (6.60) 
Dec14 -1.26 23.89*** 28.00*** 28.47*** 
 (9.11) (7.13) (6.85) (6.58) 
Mar15 7.66 33.33*** 37.70*** 35.83*** 
 (9.85) (9.59) (8.61) (7.96) 
Jun15 17.15** 45.02*** 46.73*** 48.78*** 
 (8.44) (8.55) (7.97) (7.70) 
Sep15 4.74 28.00*** 34.76*** 33.22*** 
 (10.89) (8.20) (8.42) (7.82) 
Dec15 34.50*** 57.44*** 64.06*** 62.66*** 
 (9.10) (8.48) (8.89) (8.04) 
Intercept -1784.11** 446.49 -1753.50**  
 (703.49) (10.36) (666.81)  
R2 0.821 0.739 0.814 0.832 
N 857 1, 223 1, 223 1, 223 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and postcode clusters are in parentheses. For the fixed-
effects regression [4], the within R2 coefficient is reported. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 5: Effect of Lockout Laws – By Bedroom Type 
Dependent variable: 
       MedianWeeklyRent 






Sample periods used Jun14–Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 
(A) one-bedroom dwellings    
Flock -26.76 17.49 -17.96  
 (22.95) (26.63) (22.74)  
Flock*Post (DID Estimator)  -7.51 -11.45* -9.89 
  (5.89) (6.41) (5.94) 
Period Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Other control variables YES  YES  
Postcode fixed effects    YES 
R2 0.309 0.030 0.326 0.163 
N 261 370 370 370 
(B) 2 bedroom dwellings     
Flock -1.40 48.78** -5.38  
 (19.21) (19.56) (19.98)  
Flock*Post (DID Estimator)  2.14 1.74 2.67 
  (8.74) (8.75) (8.51) 
Period Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Other control variables YES  YES  
Postcode fixed effects    YES 
R2 0.598 0.124 0.610 0.436 
N 278 399 399 398 
(C) 3 bedroom dwellings     
Flock -57.50 -15.60 -78.88*  
 (39.75) (39.89) (40.73)  
Flock*Post (DID Estimator)  22.57** 19.45** 19.41** 
  (10.21) (9.58) (9.04) 
Period Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Other control variables YES  YES  
Postcode fixed effects    YES 
R2 0.623 0.034 0.648 0.210 
N 257 371 371 371 
(D) 3 and 4+ bedroom dwellings    
4+ Bedroom 355.38*** 377.71*** 363.90*** 388.01*** 
 (64.65) (98.38) (68.48) (69.14) 
Flock -83.65 -119.07* -127.81**  
 (60.08) (65.76) (61.44)  
Flock*Post (DID Estimator)  78.68*** 62.28** 55.86** 
  (26.88) (24.90) (26.86) 
Period Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Other control variables YES  YES  
Postcode fixed effects    YES 
R2 0.650 0.363 0.662 0.581 
N 355 469 469 469 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and postcode clusters are in parentheses. For the fixed-
effects regression [4], the within R2 coefficient is reported. 




Table 6: Robustness of DID Regression Results 
Dep.var.: MedianWeeklyRent 1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom 3+ Bedroom 
(A) Short-term effect (sample period Jun13-Dec14, instead of Jun13-Dec15) 
[2] DID No Controls -11.29* -1.30 12.74 46.30* 
 (6.35) (8.67) (7.77) (24.63) 
[3] DID with Controls -15.41** -1.81 8.98 38.52 
 (6.87) (8.84) (8.34) (23.13) 
[4] DID with Fixed Effects -14.23** -1.60 7.92 49.58** 
 (6.18) (8.65) (7.70) (23.25) 
(B) Excluding areas whose KmsCBD >= 6km  
[2] DID No Controls -9.97 3.74 25.67* 80.67** 
 (6.94) (9.77) (14.70) (30.76) 
[3] DID with Controls -14.47* 2.20 22.13* 42.56 
 (8.27) (10.33) (12.55) (26.61) 
[4] DID with Fixed Effects -10.24 3.74 23.79* 34.38 
 (6.99) (9.75) (11.82) (28.15) 
(C-1) Moving Postcode 2009 (Pyrmont and Darling Island) from Flock to Control group 
[2] DID No Controls -8.19 4.41 23.18** 83.12*** 
[3] DID with Controls -11.92 4.07 20.28* 67.82** 
[4] DID with Fixed Effects -10.58 4.98 20.30** 62.74** 
(C-2) Moving Postcode 2016 (Redfern) from Flock to Control group  
[2] DID No Controls -2.41 0.47 27.38*** 82.12*** 
[3] DID with Controls -5.84 0.09 24.25** 66.71** 
[4] DID with Fixed Effects -4.65 1.01 24.23*** 58.42* 
(C-3) Moving Postcode 2017 (Waterloo and Zetland) from Flock to Control group 
[2] DID No Controls -5.24 6.07 23.20** 85.26*** 
[3] DID with Controls -9.20 5.71 20.11* 67.44** 
[4] DID with Fixed Effects -7.59 6.62 20.17* 62.63** 
(C-4) Moving Postcode 2037 (Glebe, Harold Park, Forest Lodge) from Flock to Control group 
[2] DID No Controls -10.56* -6.32 14.19* 48.01** 
[3] DID with Controls -13.95** -6.71 11.24 32.91** 
[4] DID with Fixed Effects -12.84** -5.79 11.12 21.77 
(C-5) Moving Postcode 2042 (Enmore and Newtown) from Flock to Control group 
[2] DID No Controls -9.52 5.06 21.42* 69.58* 
[3] DID with Controls -13.01* 4.67 18.28* 54.90 
[4] DID with Fixed Effects -11.79* 5.58 18.24* 56.97 
(C-6) Moving Postcode 2043 (Erskineville) from Flock to Control group  
[2] DID No Controls -7.63 2.61 21.89* 85.18*** 
[3] DID with Controls -11.88 2.25 18.78* 68.22** 
[4] DID with Fixed Effects -10.00 3.16 18.79* 61.61** 
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients on Flock*Post (the DID estimator). Standard errors 
robust to heteroscedasticity and postcode clusters are in parentheses. 






Figure 1: Flock, Control, and Lockout Postcodes
 
Note: The actual lockout area (the Kings Cross and CBD entertainment precincts) is smaller than the 








Figure 2: Trends in Weekly Rent 
(A) One-bedroom dwellings 
 
(B) 2 bedroom dwellings 
 
(C) 3 bedroom dwellings
 
Note: The figures show time trends in the mean of the postcode-level median weekly rental price data for 
three groups: the displacement postcodes (Treatment), control postcodes (Control), and postcodes directly 






























































































































































Table A1: List of Postcode Areas Used in Analysis 
Postcode Flock/Control/Lockout Suburbs Represented by Postcode 
2000 Lockout 
Barangaroo, Darling Harbour, Dawes Point, Haymarket, Millers Point, 
Parliament House, Sydney, Sydney South and The Rocks 
2007 Control Ultimo 
2008 Control Chippendale, Darlington, Golden Grove 
2009 Flock Darling Island, Pyrmont 
2010 Lockout Darlinghurst, Surry Hills and Taylor Square 
2011 Lockout 
Elizabeth Bay, HMAS Kuttabul, Kings Cross, Potts Point, Rushcutters 
Bay and Woolloomooloo 
2015 Control Alexandria, Beaconsfield, Eveleigh 
2016 Flock Redfern 
2017 Flock Waterloo, Zetland 
2018 Control Eastlakes, Rosebery 
2020 Control Mascot, Sydney Domestic Airport, Sydney International Airport 
2021 Lockout Centennial Park, Moore Park and Paddington 
2022 Control Bondi Junction, Bondi Junction Plaza, Queens Park 
2023 Control Bellevue Hill 
2024 Control Bronte, Charing Cross, Waverley 
2025 Control Woollahra 
2027 Control Darling Point, Edgecliff, HMAS Rushcutters, Point Piper 
2028 Control Double Bay 
2029 Control Rose Bay 
2031 Control Clovelly, Clovelly West, Randwick, St Pauls 
2032 Control Daceyville, Kingsford 
2033 Control Kensington 
2037 Flock Forest Lodge, Glebe 
2038 Control Annandale 
2039 Control Rozelle 
2040 Control Leichhardt, Lilyfield 
2041 Control Balmain, Balmain East, Birchgrove 
2042 Flock Enmore, Newtown 
2043 Flock Erskineville 
2044 Control St Peters, Sydenham, Tempe 
2047 Control Drummoyne 
2048 Control Stanmore, Westgate 
2050 Control Camperdown 
2060 Control 
HMAS Platypus, HMAS Waterhen, Lavender Bay, McMahons Point, 
North Sydney, North Sydney Shopping World, Waverton 
2061 Control Kirribilli, Milsons Point 
2062 Control Cammeray 
2063 Control Northbridge 
2064 Control Artarmon 
2065 Control 
Crows Nest, Gore Hill, Greenwich, Naremburn, Royal North Shore 
Hospital, St Leonards, Wollstonecraft 
2088 Control Mosman 
2089 Control Neutral Bay, Neutral Bay Junction 
2090 Control Cremorne, Cremorne Point 
2110 Control Hunters Hill, Hunters Hill West, Woolwich 
2130 Control Summer Hill 





Table A2: Effect of Lockout Laws – One-Bedroom Dwellings 
Dependent variable: 
       MedianWeeklyRent 






Sample periods used Jun14–Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 
Flock -26.76 17.49 -17.96  
 (22.95) (26.63) (22.74)  
Flock*Post (DID Estimator)  -7.51 -11.45* -9.89 
  (5.89) (6.41) (5.94) 
KmsCBD -12.00  -11.84  
 (7.68)  (7.42)  
%Renters 2.61  2.73  
 (1.62)  (1.68)  
%Singles -3.52  -3.11  
 (5.41)  (5.12)  
AvgNumChild 136.35  133.73  
 (88.39)  (92.16)  
MedAge -3.91  -3.72  
 (3.80)  (3.65)  
MedIncome 0.05  0.05  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  
SchoolsPer1000 -27.58**  -31.80**  
 (12.22)  (13.49)  
Sep13  -1.83 -0.95 -1.67 
  (4.65) (4.80) (9.11) 
Dec13  -0.78 0.98 0.88 
  (5.82) (5.04) (4.54) 
Jun14  13.49** 17.51*** 16.54*** 
  (5.65) (6.50) (5.66) 
Sep14 -5.98 5.80 11.55* 10.40* 
 (4.40) (6.65) (6.15) (5.17) 
Dec14 3.11 17.29*** 20.67*** 20.26*** 
 (5.88) (5.84) (5.45) (4.59) 
Mar15 5.10 19.73*** 22.51*** 20.50*** 
 (4.72) (3.76) (4.38) (3.80) 
Jun15 3.31 16.57** 20.76*** 20.27*** 
 (5.77) (6.95) (7.18) (6.39) 
Sep15 -0.09 11.20 17.84** 14.08*** 
 (5.36) (6.69) (6.93) (5.80) 
Dec15 16.36** 27.17*** 34.20*** 30.13*** 
 (5.79) (5.99) (7.01) (6.08) 
Intercept 521.16 456.57 464.45  
 (543.09) (10.69) (523.72)  
R2 0.309 0.304 0.326 0.163 
N 261 370 370 370 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and postcode clusters are in parentheses. For the fixed-
effects regression [4], the within R2 coefficient is reported. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A3: Effect of Lockout Laws – 2 Bedroom Dwellings 
Dependent variable: 
       MedianWeeklyRent 






Sample periods used Jun14–Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 
Flock -1.40 48.78** -5.38  
 (19.21) (19.56) (19.98)  
Flock*Post (DID Estimator)  2.14 1.74 2.67 
  (8.74) (8.75) (8.51) 
KmsCBD -32.10***  -30.59***  
 (6.33)  (6.17)  
%Renters 1.09  1.27  
 (1.71)  (1.64)  
%Singles 2.79  1.78  
 (4.81)  (4.73)  
AvgNumChild 110.20  93.51  
 (78.35)  (74.49)  
MedAge 4.20  3.29  
 (4.12)  (3.90)  
MedIncome 0.04  0.05*  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  
SchoolsPer1000 -16.13  -19.30  
 (13.07)  (13.15)  
Sep13  -7.75 -7.67 -7.75 
  (4.88) (4.92) (4.87) 
Dec13  6.02 6.26 5.25 
  (4.89) (5.07) (4.81) 
Jun14  26.93*** 27.37*** 26.85*** 
  (5.65) (5.78) (5.59) 
Sep14 -4.38 22.62*** 22.98*** 22.54*** 
 (4.79) (6.38) (6.42) (6.31) 
Dec14 -1.21 25.65*** 26.17*** 25.57*** 
 (5.05) (6.23) (6.32) (6.17) 
Mar15 6.65 33.86*** 33.82*** 31.29*** 
 (4.45) (7.85) (7.47) (6.74) 
Jun15 11.87** 38.93*** 39.22*** 38.85*** 
 (5.25) (6.84) (6.88) (6.80) 
Sep15 6.64 32.80*** 34.17*** 32.72*** 
 (4.78) (5.28) (5.51) (5.26) 
Dec15 35.06*** 61.74*** 62.34*** 59.18*** 
 (3.77) (7.69) (7.35) (6.54) 
Intercept 142.71 598.18 228.42  
 (528.62) (13.25) (515.37)  
R2 0.598 0.124 0.610 0.436 
N 278 399 399 398 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and postcode clusters are in parentheses. For the fixed-
effects regression [4], the within R2 coefficient is reported. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A4: Effect of Lockout Laws – 3 Bedroom Dwellings 
Dependent variable: 
       MedianWeeklyRent 






Sample periods used Jun14–Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 
Flock -57.50 -15.60 -78.89*  
 (39.75) (39.89) (40.73)  
Flock*Post (DID Estimator)  25.57** 19.45** 19.41** 
  (10.21) (9.58) (9.04) 
KmsCBD -33.31**  -35.03***  
 (12.71)  (11.69)  
%Renters 9.27***  9.32***  
 (2.50)  (2.42)  
%Singles 16.57**  16.13**  
 (8.05)  (7.54)  
AvgNumChild 641.88***  654.40***  
 (127.87)  (123.44)  
MedAge 19.01***  18.38***  
 (5.58)  (5.07)  
MedIncome 0.15***  0.16***  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  
SchoolsPer1000 -51.72***  -53.50***  
 (13.45)  (13.86)  
Sep13  -16.89 -19.64* -19.82** 
  (10.22) (10.45) (9.25) 
Dec13  1.26 5.59 10.65 
  (17.14) (16.44) (16.26) 
Jun14  14.37 23.08** 23.63** 
  (11.67) (11.42) (10.71) 
Sep14 -14.82 9.45 8.26 7.27 
 (15.30) (13.45) (14.27) (13.58) 
Dec14 -12.81 4.93 10.35 17.08 
 (13.13) (11.59) (10.90) (10.83) 
Mar15 19.43 41.57** 42.55*** 44.21*** 
 (14.23) (14.63) (14.71) (14.59) 
Jun15 35.13** 52.15*** 58.39*** 62.11*** 
 (15.99) (13.64) (13.62) (13.35) 
Sep15 17.91 37.76*** 41.18*** 40.33*** 
 (14.90) (13.09) (13.60) (12.89) 
Dec15 51.31*** 72.24*** 74.19*** 75.04*** 
 (12.88) (11.80) (11.14) (10.87) 
Intercept -2597.77*** 869.28 -2586.72***  
 (635.09) (25.59) (580.64)  
R2 0.623 0.038 0.648 0.210 
N 257 371 371 371 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and postcode clusters are in parentheses. For the fixed-
effects regression [4], the within R2 coefficient is reported.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table A5: Effect of Lockout Laws – 3 and 4+ Bedroom Dwellings 
Dependent variable: 
       MedianWeeklyRent 






Sample periods used Jun14–Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 Jun13-Dec15 
Bedroom type (reference: 3 bedroom)    
      4+ Bedroom 355.38*** 377.71*** 363.90*** 388.01*** 
 (64.65) (98.38) (68.48) (69.14) 
Flock -83.65 -119.07* -127.81**  
 (60.08) (65.76) (61.44)  
Flock*Post (DID Estimator)  78.68*** 62.28** 55.86** 
  (26.88) (24.90) (26.86) 
KmsCBD -7.86  -14.42  
 (22.25)  (19.53)  
%Renters 11.01***  10.74***  
 (3.93)  (3.40)  
%Singles 41.01***  35.47***  
 (14.63)  (12.69)  
AvgNumChild 864.17***  817.82***  
 (176.79)  (160.00)  
MedAge 11.57  12.84*  
 (7.67)  (6.70)  
MedIncome 0.37***  0.33***  
 (0.09)  (0.08)  
SchoolsPer1000 -81.18***  -76.08***  
 (22.63)  (20.48)  
Sep13  -11.14 -9.83 -7.09 
  (30.11) (26.58) (26.37) 
Dec13  11.72 15.34 29.25* 
  (19.05) (16.33) (16.37) 
Jun14  26.10 37.08*** 43.03*** 
  (16.32) (13.00) (12.09) 
Sep14 9.21 -3.09 15.37 14.58 
 (20.75) (20.88) (16.66) (16.60) 
Dec14 29.05 16.12 34.31* 42.10** 
 (24.94) (21.43) (19.19) (18.89) 
Mar15 45.38* 33.41 48.66** 51.72** 
 (26.38) (25.71) (20.95) (20.89) 
Jun15 65.94*** 63.00*** 72.06*** 79.93*** 
 (20.24) (18.83) (16.30) (15.69) 
Sep15 41.34 27.07 45.50* 50.82** 
 (26.62) (28.11) (24.16) (23.57) 
Dec15 88.17*** 69.32*** 90.45*** 93.20*** 
 (28.23) (24.43) (23.75) (21.87) 
Intercept -5201.27*** 878.27 -4624.70***  
 (1423.39) (31.44) (1206.85)  
R2 0.650 0.363 0.662 0.581 
N 355 469 469 469 
Note: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and postcode clusters are in parentheses. For the fixed-
effects regression [4], the within R2 coefficient is reported.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
